










SKYPE AT THE BORDER: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF VIDEO 
TELECONFERENCING IN IMMIGRATION COURT PROCEEDINGS DURING  






Plan II Honor Program  











Amy Kristin Sanders 
School of Journalism  












Part I: Background Information………………………………………………………………..6 
 
Statement of the Problem ……………………………………………………………….. 6 
 
Brief History of Immigration and Asylum Policy in the U.S.…………………………….9 
  Asylum in the United States……………………………………………………..18  
  How to Apply for Asylum……………………………………………………….20 
 
Issues at Hand: Evolution towards Exclusionary Deterrence Based Asylum Policies and 
The Rise of Video Teleconferencing in the Era of Trump..…………………………….23 
 Heart of the War: Migrant Protection Protocols…………………………………26 




 Limitations: Research in the Midst of a Pandemic………………………………………34 
 
Part II: The Impact of Video Teleconferencing in Immigration Court Proceedings 
Literature Review……………………………………………………………………35 
 
Communication and Psychology Research of Video-Mediated Communication……….36 
 
 Empirical Findings of the use of VTC in Immigration Court Proceedings……………...39 
 
Part III: Qualitative Research…………………………………………………………………45 
 
 VTC Use for Detainees…………………………………………………………………..45 
  
 Respondent Alienation…………………………………………………………………..48 
 
 Complication of Litigation Mechanics…………………………………………………..49 
 
 Courtroom Working group……..………………………………………………….…….51 
 
Part IV: Suggestions on How to Use VTC…………………………………………………….53 
 
Part V: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...55 
 3 
 
Appendix A (Images) …………………………………………………………………………..57 
 










I would like to thank my supervisor, Amy Sanders. I would not have been able to finish this 
project if it were not her steadfast belief in me throughout this process. My topic changed 
drastically from my initial idea and her tireless support and openness to learn alongside me kept 
me motivated and excited about my own work.   
Thank you Dr. S.   
 
 I would also like to thank my second reader, Edward Shore. Entering this process I knew I 
wanted to research something in the realm of Latin American studies—his expertise and my 
interest. Little did I know his research connections and suggestions would open doors that would 
help me discover what I want to do with my future career.  
 Thank you Professor Shore.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends. Mom and Dad, I love you and am so 
grateful for your support throughout my college career. Austin, I cannot thank you enough for 
talking through my underdeveloped ideas and listening to hours of me reading out loud early 
drafts. Trisha, our “thesis check-ins,” even when I did not want to update you on my lack of 
progress, kept me on track. This thesis would not have been complete without you all. 




Since 1996, immigration courts have used video teleconferencing (VTC) in immigration court 
proceedings surfacing questions about the ethicality of its use. Initially, scholars raised strong 
arguments against the use of VTC because of the inability to build trust between respondent and 
judge through video-mediated communication. Later, Ingrid Eagly, a law professor at UCLA, 
found that the correlation between depressed rates of relief in detained cases conducted via video 
teleconferencing was a consequence of litigants’ disengagement with the legal process involved 
in applying for relief. To evaluate the current use and impact of VTC on immigration court 
proceedings during the Trump Era, I interviewed immigration attorneys and law students, as well 
as visited detention centers and observed an immigration court proceeding. I found that 
restricting access to the legal resources necessary to navigate the U.S. immigration system 
exposes much deeper, more structural inequities in our asylum system. The prevalence of video-
mediated communication is but a symptom of this inequality, a tool in the detention-to-
deportation timeline.  
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Part 1 
Statement of the Problem 
“Coming to the U.S. was very unexpectedly horrific. When I was 12 years old, the only 
thing I was thinking about was surviving. I didn’t want to die,” said El, a young Guatemalan girl, 
in the documentary film, A Line Birds Cannot See (2019). The animated short film, narrated by 
El, follows her journey from Guatemala to the United States. While heartbreaking, El’s narrative 
represents one variation of a story told by tens of thousands of migrants at the southwest border. 
The film, only nine minutes and fifty-seven seconds long, brings a frequently untold personal 
migrant narrative to light that would otherwise be lost in the saturated media landscape of 
immigration accounts told by outsiders. 
For those attempting to enter the United States at the southwest border, constant changes 
in U.S. immigration policy that aim to curtail illegal entry make the path to the north far from 
safe.1 El’s mother fled Guatemala in part to escape an abusive husband, leaving El and her 
siblings behind with the hopes of one day reuniting her family in the United States. For El, her 
mother’s departure was the first of many separations she would endure. Fortunately, her mother 
managed to return to Guatemala and brought her children to the U.S. Her mother and siblings 
sold all their possession, left their abusive father in Guatemala, and paid a coyote, a person or 
group that smuggles migrants into the United States, to guide them on their journey. Per the 
advice of the coyote, El separated from her family to join another group. This decision left a 12-
year-old girl, alone and walking in the desert landscape near Nuevo Laredo and Laredo. Customs 
and Border Patrol (CBP) apprehended El near the border, tired, dehydrated, and hungry. Instead 
of processing her to return her back to Guatemala or present her with the alternative to apply for 
 
1 Operations that have grown out of the demand for illegal entry into the U.S. include human smuggling and sex and 
drug trafficking.  
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asylum, CBP released her in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, knowing she had nothing and nowhere to 
go. Desperate for help, El trusted the first people that offered her shelter. For several months, 
men kept El as a sex slave in the basement of their home in Nuevo Laredo. One night, El escaped 
her captors and knocked on the door of a house she deemed safe. Fortunately, the woman that 
answered provided help and assisted El in reuniting with her mother, who had safely arrived in 
the United States. Even though they reunited, living in the U.S. as undocumented immigrants and 
eventually being processed through the immigration system was their next battle to overcome. 
The acceptance or denial of the status for migrants like El and her family rests in the hands of 
immigration courts.  
Court typically evokes an image of a large room built out of mahogany colored wood: a 
gallery filled with rows of long benches leading to the area reserved for those involved with the 
case. The attorneys sit with their clients before a judge in a long, black robe perched upon the 
bench. An American flag stands tall behind the magistrate with the words, “In God We Trust,” 
carved in wood and covered with gold leaf resting above their head. Jurors, completing their 
civic duty, sit quietly to the side. The setting exudes the authority of a place where consequential, 
potentially life-altering decisions are made.  
Immigration court proceedings, however, do not live up to the grandiose aura of criminal 
trial in made-for television dramas. Aaron Haas, a judge on the Texas 285th District Court, 
describes what a significant number of immigration courts in the United States look like today:  
“Observers are likely to see a small room located deep within a large 
federal building, with two tables perpendicular to one another, connected 
to form a right angle. A lawyer sits at each table, one representing the 
government and the other an alien. A row of chairs, behind these tables 
and against the walls, seat the family and friends of the alien. On the 
other side of the room, in view of the advocates and observers, is a 
television screen with a camera on top. This screen shows the judge on 
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one side, who may be located in another state, and the alien on the other 
side, who is seated in a detention center in a third location.”2 
 
Haas relates the experiences many asylum seekers face while petitioning for legal status in the 
United States. The judge, immigrant’s attorney (if they have one), government-appointed 
attorney (TA), and interpreter sit in the court room, while the asylum-seeker remains in a 
detention center with a video camera and monitor. Those in the immigration world know this 
practice as video teleconferencing (VTC). Legal researchers and advocates have voiced their 
concerns with the use of VTC in lieu of in-person hearings in the past; however the federal 
government has remained steadfast in their belief that VTC leads to more efficient and cost-
effective immigration trials. Moreover, attorneys and organizations that advocate for the rights of 
immigrants in this day and age have said that Trump is issuing a war on asylum and VTC is one 
of the many weapons in the Trump Administration’s arsenal.3 My research aims to assess the 
validity of the government’s support of VTC on the one hand and the deep concerns of 
immigration advocates on the other. 
Part One presents an overview of U.S. immigration history and the asylum system, 
assesses the current issues at hand with the Trump administration and video teleconferencing, 
and discusses the methodology and limitations of the study. Part Two presents a literature review 
of academic works on video teleconferencing, focusing on a 2015 study by UCLA law professor 
Ingrid Eagly, which quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed the impact of VTC on immigration 
court proceedings from 2012. Part Three presents the findings from interviews I conducted with 
Texas immigration attorneys and law students as well as reflections from Hutto Detention Center 
 
2 Aaron Haas, “Videoconferencing in Immigration Proceedings” 5, no. 1 (n.d.): 59. 
3 Immigration Justice Campaign. “The War on Asylum.” Webinar. March 31st, 2020.  
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and San Antonio Immigration Court visits. Part Four offers recommendations for U.S. 
immigration departments who use VTC going forward.  
Brief History of Immigration and Asylum in U.S. 
“Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” 
-The New Colossus by Emma Lazarus 1883 
For a deeper understanding of asylum and the current immigration policies put in place 
by the Trump administration, one must understand the duality that underscores immigration in 
the United States.  
U.S. immigration policy—past, present, and future—is and always will be a story of two 
conflicting ideologies that ebb and flow.4 According to Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American 
Nativism, (1860-1925) by John Higham, a prominent American historian during the early twentieth 
century, the United States straddles two principles: a cosmopolitan and democratic ideal of 
nationality and a traditional and conservative ideal of nativism.5 For Higham, the United States 
represents both a home of and for immigrants but also a place where strong xenophobic 
sentiment thrives. In a later book from 1984 titled Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban 
America, Higham clarifies, “one legend puts the immigrant, and all he represents, at the center of 
the American experience. Another relegates him to the peripheries.”6  
 The notion of the United States as a safe haven for immigrants dates back to its founding. 
During the seventeenth century, Puritans fled Europe to the American colony in search of a place 
 
4 John Bodnar, “Culture without Power: A Review of John Higham’s Strangers in the Land,” ed. John Higham, 
Journal of American Ethnic History 10, no. 1/2 (1990): 80–86. 
5Bodnar, John. “Culture without Power: A Review of John Higham’s Strangers in the Land.” Edited by John 
Higham. Journal of American Ethnic History 10, no. 1/2 (1990): 80–86. 
6 Higham, John. “Send These to Me. Immigrants in Urban America.” The Johns Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore and London. 1984. Pg, 4.  
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to practice religion freely. As the United States formed, immigrants entered and left as they 
pleased. It would not be until 1875, almost a full century after American independence, that the 
federal government put in place its first restrictive immigration law. However, even as the United 
States slowly began erecting borders and creating a legal immigration system, the nation had 
already solidified its reputation as a land of immigrants and Lady Liberty’s torch led the way.   
According to Higham, Americans had strongly adopted immigration as a pillar of 
American cultural identity during the early nineteenth century.7 Decades earlier, essays written 
by the French American author, Michael-Guillaume-Jean de Crevecoeur, in 1782 already 
reflected that truth. Jean de Crevecoeur, an early settler, fled to Europe after the American 
Revolution broke out and wrote about his experience emigrating to the United States and the 
general socio-religious climate in the American colonies at the time.8 The twelve essays titled 
Letters from an American Farmer, did exceptionally well commercially. Within two years of 
being published eight editions were disseminated in five countries.9 Jean de Crevecoeur wrote 
that, “[In America] individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men whose labors and 
posterity will one day cause great changes in the world.”10 His words introduced the notion of the 
“American melting pot,” an enduring metaphor that has portrayed the United States as a “land of 
opportunity” where race, religion and nationality are not barriers to social mobility and wealth.11  
In the twenty-first century, however, many progressive thinkers have moved away from the term 
“melting pot” and have opted instead for terms like the “salad bowl” that promote 
 
7 Bodnar, “Culture without Power.” 
8 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Michel-Guillaume-Saint-Jean de Crèvecoeur,” in Encyclopædia 
Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., January 27, 2020). 
9 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
10 John De Crévecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer (New York: Duffield & Company, 1904). 
11 Charles Hirschman, “America’s Melting Pot Reconsidered,” Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 397–423. 
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multiculturalism.12 Regardless, both terms evoke what Higham meant by “cosmopolitan and 
democratic idea of nationality.” Yet pluralism and xenophobia are not mutually exclusive.  
 As the United States slowly unified after the Civil War, nationalism and nativism grew. 
Nationalism, the collective unification over a national identify, and nativism, the unfavorable 
opinion of outsiders, are different sides of the same coin.13 Like a pendulum swinging, the socio-
economic and political environment in the United States changes in response to national and 
global events. Those changes can quickly transform nationalism into nativism. The passage of 
the immigration bills that radically altered the immigration system in the United States—the 
Immigration Act of 1924, 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and 2002 Homeland Security 
Act—demonstrate the influence of outside factors that determine the oscillation between a “salad 
bowl” America and an exclusionary one.    
The 1924 Immigration Act, also known as the Johnson-Reed Act, put in place a 
qualitatively discriminatory and restrictive quota system that governed legal immigration into the 
United States for forty years. It further cemented extant xenophobic legislation governing 
American immigration, like the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prohibited the 
immigration of “skilled and unskilled and Chinese employed in mining” to the US and declared 
all Chinese as ineligible for naturalization.14 Today, observers note historical parallels between 
Trump’s so-called “Muslim Ban” and the Chinese Exclusion Act demonstrating the influence of 
immigration laws centuries after their enactment.15 Congress and President Coolidge passed the 
 
12 Theresa E. McCormick (1984) Multiculturalism: Some principles and issues, Theory Into Practice, 23:2, 93-97, 
DOI: 10.1080/00405848409543097 
13 Nenad Miscevic, “Nationalism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2018 
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/nationalism/. Bodnar, “Culture without Power.” 
14 Wu, Yuning, “Chinese Exclusion Act: United States 1882,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Exclusion-Act.  
15 Robert S. Chang, “Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to Korematsu to the Muslim 
Travel Ban Cases,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 68 (2018 2017): 1183. According to Chang, “Though 
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Johnson Reed Act in response to a xenophobic shift in American consciousness after the First 
World War and the Russian Revolution. During this time, there was a considerable fear of 
foreign radicalism “invading” the United States.16 Growing distrust and anger was aimed 
frequently at Eastern European populations, particularly Jewish immigrants. Additionally, Social 
Darwinism, the idea that populations are subject to laws of natural selection, and eugenics, the 
outdated practice of the hereditary selection of “desirable” traits, flourished and were embraced 
by influential statesmen. Alan Kraut, a professor of American history at the University of 
Washington, D.C., told Smithsonian Magazine that, at the time, “eugenics was something that 
very bright, intelligent people talked about in the same way that we talk [today] about genetic 
engineering.” 17 With respect to eugenics, the 1924 Immigration Act, according to one of the 
most prominent twentieth-century eugenicists, Harry Laughlin, was to “optimize” the traits of 
immigrants entering the United States and transform how Americans perceived immigrants. 
Laughlin said:  
“The immigrant to the United States was to be looked upon, not as a source 
of cheap or competitive labor, nor as one seeking asylum from foreign 
oppression, nor as a migrant hunting a less strenuous life, but as a parent of 
future-born American citizens. This mean that the hereditary stuff out of 
which future immigrants were made would have to be compatible racially 
with American ideals.’18 
Morover, just ten years before the Johnson-Reed Act, the U.S. experienced its highest 
level of immigration to date, contributing to the nativist ferment of the early twentieth century. In 
 
[Trump’s] government attorneys do not cite or directly rely upon the Chinese Exlucion Case or Korematsu v. United 
States, these cases directly underlie their arguments, providing perhaps the strongest precedential authority for his 
actions". 
16 Madeline Hsu, “Emergency Quota Law (1921),” Immigration History, Emergency Quota Law (1921) (blog), 
accessed April 10, 2020, https://immigrationhistory.org/item/1921-emergency-quota-law/. 
17 Lorraine Boissoneault, “Literacy Tests and Asian Exclusion Were the Hallmarks of the 1917 Immigration Act,” 
Smithsonian Magazine, accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-america-grappled-
immigration-100-years-ago-180962058/. 
18 Harry H. Laughlin, Analysis of America’s Modern Melting Pot: Hearings before the 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, November 21, 1922 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1923), 731, 757. 
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1907, 1.3 million immigrants passed through Ellis Island, attracted to the United States because 
of the industrial boom and the promise of factory work.19 Many of the immigrants who entered 
found jobs in the industrial economy in the north, making up the majority of waged workers in 
Pennsylvania coal fields, Chicago stockyards, and New York garment factories.  
Immigration plummeted in the wake of 1924. The graph, figure 1.3, from the World 
Economic Forum, demonstrates the sharp decline of immigration to the U.S. of nearly 84 
percent. Furthermore, figure 1.2, a political cartoon from 1921, depicts what immigration with 
the restrictive quotes put in place felt like to the both the American population and European 
immigrants attempting to enter the United States. Like the political cartoon depicts, the 3% quota 
on European immigration, made the process of entering the United States akin to squeezing 
through a funnel.20   
Immigration policy did not drastically change again until the 1965 Harts Cellar Act, also 
known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which is now the basis of modern 
immigration policy today. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) signaled a 
relaxation of immigration controls after decades of restrictive quotas. The postwar period and the 
gains of the Civil Rights Movement provoked President Lyndon B. Johnson and Congress to 
revisit the discriminatory immigration laws of the past.21 Supporters viewed the act as a historical 
correction to the nation’s racist immigration policies and an extension of the civil rights 
movement during the 1960s. Congressional representative Robert Sweeney (D-Ohio) during the 
time said:   
"Mr. Chairman, I would consider the amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to be as important as the landmark legislation of this 
 
19 Boissoneault, “Literacy Tests and Asian Exclusion Were the Hallmarks of the 1917 Immigration Act.” 
20 See Appendix A 
21 David Weissbrody, Laura Danielson, Howard S. Myers, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 7th ed. 
(West Academic Publishing, 2017). 
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Congress relating to the Civil Rights Act. The central purpose of the 
administration's immigration bill is to once again undo discrimination and 
to revise the standards by which we choose potential Americans in order 
to be fairer to them and which will certainly be more beneficial to us."22 
 
Although the INA was well-intentioned, the federal government did not anticipate the 
sudden spike in immigration to the United States and the backlog it would create. The 1965 INA 
eradicated the quota laws of the Johnson-Reed Act and implemented a new priority-based 
system. The system of preferences included seventy-five percent of immigration reserved for 
family reunification, twenty percent for employment and five percent for refugees. Each country 
received an annual cap of 20,000 per year, which also included countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.23 For the first time, immigration truly opened up for non-European populations. 
However, according to historian Mae Ngai, the law was not truly inclusive towards.24 Ngai noted 
that the law prioritized legal citizenship for high-skilled workers, but left many unskilled workers 
in sectors like agriculture and construction unable to gain citizenship or work authorization in the 
United States, contributing to an increase in undocumented immigration.  
The annual cap the INA placed on legal immigration from all countries including those 
from Latin America in addition to the end of the Bracero Program, created the conditions for the 
prevalence of unauthorized immigration from Latin America prevalent today. The Bracero 
Program was a bilateral-contract labor program between the U.S. and Mexico that provided 
American farmers and other industries that suffered from labor shortages after World War II with 
Mexican laborers through short-term labor contracts to work in the U.S.25 
 
22 Congressional Record, August, 25, 1965, p. 21765 
23 Madeline Hsu, “Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act),” Immigration History (blog), 
accessed April 10, 2020, https://immigrationhistory.org/item/hart-celler-act/. 
24 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America, Updated (United States: 
Princeton University Press, 2014). 
25 Center for History and New Media, “About,” Bracero History Archive, accessed April 12, 2020, 
http://braceroarchive.org/about. 
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Two consequences of the program were an increase in both legal and illegal Mexican workers 
and greater dependency on the high-intensity, cheap labor.26 In theory, Mexico and the United 
States put in place safeguards to ensure that American farmers did not take advantage of 
Mexican laborers and that only U.S. businesses facing labor shortages received Bracero workers. 
However, in practice, these aims did not come to fruition.27 After 12 years and the gradual 
increase of fraud and mistreatment of workers, U.S. and Mexico decided to end the program.28  
Although well-intentioned, the end of the program had greater consequences than both the U.S. 
and Mexican government expected. Mexican immigration and American demand for cheap labor 
from Mexico did not stop even though the bi-lateral agreement had been eradicated. During the 
years of the Bracero Program, the amount of removals and returns of undocumented immigrants 
plummeted, but after its termination the amount of removals sky rocketed (see figure 1.4). The 
cessation of the program did not end temporary worker migration into the United States, it 
criminalized it.29 Overall, the 1965 INA was an achievement of the civil rights era. But, in 
conjunction with the end of the Bracero program and the introduction of universal immigration 
caps, it led to an increase in unauthorized immigration from Latin America and the beginning of 
new immigration struggles.   
The next significant immigration policy change came at the heels of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001. According to the Migration Policy Institute, an independent, nonpartisan, 
nonprofit think tank dedicated to the study of the movement of people, “the post-9/11 era has 
witnessed the emergence of an immigration system in the United States dominated by national 
 
26 Alex Nowrasteh, “Enforcement Didn’t End Unlawful Immigration in 1950s, More Visas Did,” Cato Institute 
(blog), November 11, 2015, https://www.cato.org/blog/enforcement-didnt-end-unlawful-immigration-1950s-more-
visas-did. 
27 Center for History and New Media, “About.” 
28 Center for History and New Media. 
29 See appendix A 
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security and enforcement consideration[s].” The 9/11 attackers entered the United States on 
travel visas, which stoked nativist backlash and renewed contentious debates over immigration 
law. As a consequence, the Bush administration’s actions after 9/11 are a reflection of what 
Roxane Cohen Silver calls a “shattered sense of security and perceptions of invulnerability 
among resident of the United States and the Western world.”30   
To make immigration more focused on enforcement and defense, President George W. 
Bush signed the 2002 Homeland Security Act, ushering the most significant reorganization of the 
Defense Department since the Second World War. In an effort to streamline and make 
immigration processes more efficient, the legislation created the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), which brought 22 federal agencies under one roof.  The goals of the new 
department were to create a “zone of security” beyond US borders, enforce immigration laws to 
a larger extent, and deny immigration benefits to “dangerous individuals.”31 Many of the 
functions of the US Immigration and Naturalizations Service (INS)—previously a bureau of the 
US Department of Justice (DOJ)—were divided into three smaller departments under the 
jurisdiction of DHS: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 32 Today, CBP enforces 
immigration and customs law at ports of entry and between ports of entry. ICE assumed the 
investigative functions of INS and Customs Service, INS detention and removal functions and all 
of its intelligence operations. Finally, USCIS oversees legal immigration, including work permits 
and visas into the United States.  
 
30 Roxane Cohen Silver, “An Introduction to ‘9/11: Ten Years Later’.,” American Psychologist 66, no. 6 (2011): 
427–28, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024804. 
31 Nowrasteh, “Enforcement Didn’t End Unlawful Immigration in 1950s, More Visas Did,” 11. 
32 David Weissbrody, Laura Danielson, Howard S. Myers, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell. 
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One of the major policy goals and consequences of the creation of DHS was an increase 
in border enforcement, particularly at the southwest border.33 Through billions of dollars in 
manpower, infrastructure, and equipment, DHS has implemented many border security 
initiatives that include unmanned drones patrolling border regions to motion sensors made to 
detect the movement of illegal crossing at the border.  Before the initiative was called off in 
January 2011 because of project costs and technical problems, the U.S. government invested$30 
billion into a technology known as SBInet or the “virtual fence.” It was supposed to provide 
high-tech surveillance of the border through motion-detector sensors, remotely operated cameras 
and unmanned vehicles.34 Even though the “virtual border” was never completed, the project 
reflects the vast investment the federal government has directed toward immigration border 
protection since 9/11. Figure 1.5 demonstrates the steady increase of the CBP budget since it 
began operations in 2004.35   
Additionally, the post-9/11 era has introduced a new generation of intelligence and law 
enforcement initiatives that have altered the way immigration enforcement operates on a local, 
state and federal level. Through the implementation of interoperable databases and systems, post-
9/11 immigration practices have blurred the lines between federal and local immigration 
enforcement. For example, a statute from the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, 287[g], gained significant funding following the attacks. Through the statute, 
the federal government can delegate immigration enforcement powers to state and local officers, 
allowing local and state officers to engage in immigration screenings during their field policing 
 
33 Michelle Mittelstadt et al., “Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration Policy and Program 
Changes in the Decade since 9/11” (Migration Policy Institute, August 2011). 
34 “Why SBINet Has Failed | Homeland Security Newswire,” accessed April 12, 2020, 
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/why-sbinet-has-failed. 
35 See Appendix A 
 18 
operations. Thus, if law enforcement officials detain a suspect for a traffic violation, they have 
the legal jurisdiction to also arrest the suspect for immigration violations as well. The goal of 
Section 287[g] is to target “dangerous criminals.” However in 2010, the Migrant Policy Institute 
found that roughly half of those arrested through the statute were noncitizens arrested for 
misdemeanors or traffic violations.36 Moreover, programs like Secure Communities—a 
partnership that began in 2008 that allows for ICE and other federal agencies like the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to share information with one another and local and state 
entities—further entangle federal, state, and local immigration operations. With information that 
ICE gains through the partnership, it can proceed in the way it deems necessary depending on the 
prioritization of the individual’s removal. In most cases, ICE will prioritize most high-risk cases 
that present the most significant threats such as those with a significant criminal history. 
The 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, and the 2002 
Department of Homeland Security Act are the result of a change in the way the U.S. perceived 
immigration—at times welcoming it and at others tightening borders.  
Asylum in the United States 
Asylum policies in the U.S. also reflect the dualism that underlies the ideology of 
immigration in America. Historically, the U.S. has been slow to enact policy that grants asylum 
seekers legal entry into the United States. In 1948, in the wake of World War II, the UN ratified 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which contained Article 14 guaranteeing that 
“everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”37 The 
declaration sought to universally protect human rights for the first time and promoted legal 
 
36 Mittelstadt et al., “Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration Policy and Program Changes in 
the Decade since 9/11,” 11. 
37 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” October 6, 2015. https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-
rights/index.html. 
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protections for refugees.38 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees established 
the definition of a refugee as someone who has a “well-founded fear of persecution in their home 
country because of their race, religion nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside his or her country of nationality, and is unable to receive protection 
from their country, and or return to their country for the fear of persecution (see Article 
1A(s)).”39 The 1951 Convention outlined a number of rights granted to refugees through 
international law, but the cornerstone was the principle of non-refoulment from Article 33.40 
Non-refoulment protects refugees from being sent back to a country where they fear persecution 
and or threats to their life. In 1967, the 1951 Convention was amended to broaden its 
geographical and time limits (previously only applied to those fleeing Europe before January 1, 
1951) to be applicable globally and in perpetuity.  
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 gave the U.S. Attorney General power to 
grant asylum to migrants unable or unwilling to return to their countries in accordance with the 
1951 Refugee Act. However, legislation governing asylum before the 1980s usually applied only 
to migrants who served the national interest. For example, from the Cold War era until the mid- 
1990s, the large majority of refugees resettled in the United States were those fleeing the former 
Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. The U.S. supported sheltering populations who were fleeing 
communist regimes. Some of the policies enacted during this time included the 1959 Cuban 
Refugee Act, in which the U.S. opened its borders to people feeling the violence of the Cuban 
Revolution and the subsequent rise of Fidel Castro. Between 1961 and 1962, approximately 
 
38 “Asylum & the Rights of Refugees | International Justice Resource Center.” Accessed December 3, 2019. 
https://ijrcenter.org/refugee-law/. 
39 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons,” UNHCR, accessed December 11, 2019, 
https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html. 
40 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 
Protocol” (Switzerland: UNHCR, September 2011). 
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60,000 Cubans entered under the program and were processed through a specially opened INS 
processing center in Miami, Florida. 
In 1980, the U.S. finally acceded to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol through 
the 1980s Refugee Act. Although the Refugee Act did not terminate the biased admission of 
certain asylum seekers, the law broadened eligibility and created a formal asylum system.  
Indeed, it expanded the definition of refugees in accordance with the 1951 Convention, created 
the precedent for presidents in consultation with Congress to set the number of refugees to be 
admitted into the United States each year and established explicit procedures on how to process 
and absorb asylum and refugee seekers into the United States.  
How to Apply for Asylum  
The process differs for applying for asylum or refugee status. Asylum applicants are 
those already residing in the U.S. or at the border. Refugees are screened overseas then granted 
or denied refugee status in the United States.  
Applying for asylum requires a formal adjudication process. There are two types of 
asylum: affirmative asylum and defensive asylum. Affirmative asylum applies to those 
individuals not apprehended at the border or near the border by CBP.  Those applying for 
affirmative asylum have entered the U.S. either with a visa, such as a travel visa, crossed the 
southwest or northern border without being apprehended, or are an unaccompanied child 
protected under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA).41 
Only if the applicant has not previously appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) or Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), the first step in applying for asylum if filling out the I-589 
 
41 “Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act Safeguards Children,” National Immigration Forum, 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act Safeguard Children (blog), May 23, 2018, 
https://immigrationforum.org/article/trafficking-victims-protection-reauthorization-act-safeguards-children/. 
 21 
application within a year of arriving to the United States. Once USCIS has received and 
approved the application, the asylum seeker will receive notice for an interview with an asylum 
officer at one of eight asylum offices, two asylum sub-offices, or at a USCIS field office. If the 
asylum officer finds that the asylum seeker demonstrates “credible fear” and would be harmed 
being returned home, they are granted asylum. Once granted asylum, the U.S. gives asylees the 
opportunity to apply for an employment authorization document (EAD), Social Security card, 
green card for permanent residence and immigration benefits for spouses and unmarried children 
under the age of 21. However, if the asylum application is denied, the asylum seeker will be 
referred to an Immigration Judge for removal proceedings.  
The defensive asylum process, while similar to that of affirmative asylum, involves other 
organizations outside of the USCIS, including ICE, CBP and the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (EOIR), a department under the DOJ in charge of immigration court 
proceedings. Those placed in defensive asylum system include migrants who have arrived at a 
port of entry and requested asylum or those caught between ports of entry or within 100 miles of 
the border by CBP.  Once they are apprehended, migrants are automatically put into expedited 
removal proceedings. Until recently, Customs and Border Patrol could only kept apprehended 
asylum seekers in their custody for 48 hours before turning them over to ICE custody. ICE 
would then place them in one of their fifteen detention facilities as they awaited their credible 
fear interview.  
Like the affirmative asylum process, asylum officers determine the validity of asylum 
seekers claims in a credible fear interview. According to the 1951 Convention, only the five 
following characteristics constitute credible fear: persecution based on race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion or belief, or membership (formal or informal) in a group. If an asylum officer 
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denies the CFI, the asylum seeker has two options: accept the denial and begin the deportation 
process or appeal the denial to be seen before an IJ. In an appeal of a CFI denial, the IJ reviews 
the case and makes a final decision on the legitimacy of the asylum seekers credible fear. If 
denied once again, ICE deports the asylum seeker. However, if the IJ does find credible fear, 
EOIR presents the asylum seeker with a notice to appear (NTA), formally beginning the removal 
proceedings. 
Likewise, if an asylum officer decides the asylum seeker has credible fear, the EOIR 
presents them with an NTA.  In most cases, the asylum seekers attend a hearing called the master 
calendar hearing (MCH), where the IJ informs them of their legal rights followed by usually a 
query whether they understood. At this time, the respondent can request the judge for more time 
to seek counsel or prepare an application for relief through a plead for a continuance order. After 
the MCH, if the respondent has completed an application for relief, such as an adjustment of 
status, cancellation of removal, or application for asylum, they proceed to their individual merits 
hearing.  In the Individual Merits hearings, the asylum seeker presents their case before the IJ. If 
the IJ approves the request for asylum, the immigrant is allowed into the United States legally 
and after several years may apply for permanent residence in the United States. If the IJ denies 
asylum, the respondent must begin the deportation process again. However, once again, the 
asylum seeker can appeal the asylum denial and begin the appeal process. However, if the appeal 
is denied yet again, the asylum seeker faces deportation.  
Additionally, at any point during the court proceedings, the respondent can request 
voluntary departure, a discretionary benefit where the respondent must voluntarily leave the 
United States. However, the individual will not be subject to certain statutory bars from 
reentering the United States that accompany the removal order.  
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Issues at Hand: Evolution towards Exclusionary Deterrence-Based Asylum Policies 
and The Rise of Video Teleconferencing in the Era of Trump 
This section first explores the practice of deterrence-based asylum policies from past 
decades and how President Trump has taken those a step further and changed who is eligible for 
asylum. I describe Trump’s asylum policies as “exclusionary deterrence-based policies.” Then, I 
delve into an in-depth look at Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), arguably the most drastic 
change and immediate threat to the asylum system today.  Finally, this section concludes with a 
brief introduction to video teleconferencing and its history in immigration courts.  
The Trump Administration is waging war against asylum. 42 Since the passage of the 
1980 Immigration and Refugee act, an administration has never attempted to prevent asylees and 
refugees entering the United States like the Trump administration today.43 Previous 
administrations have used deterrence-based policies since the 1990s. The goal of these policies 
was to impose a new rule or practice that made receiving asylum or physically crossing into the 
U.S. more difficult. In theory, increasing the barrier to entry would discourage people from 
journeying to the U.S. to seek asylum or enter illegally. Trump administration policies also 
attempt to dissuade people from travelling to the U.S. However, under Trump, the U.S. 
government has taken the further step of attempting to circumscribe migrants’ rights to apply for 
asylum altogether by passing a series of new policies such as preventing barring migrants from 
asylum if they passed through a third country before reaching the United States.44  Given that the 
 
42 In all 4 interviews conducted with immigration attorneys along with off the record conversations had with co-
workers at a non-profit that provided legal assistance to immigrants in Texas, people considered the current 
immigration policies as attacks on asylum. Furthermore, Immigration Justice Campaign webinars described Trump’s 
actions as “War on Asylum” 
43 Interviewee #1, interviewed by the author, Austin, Texas, February, 29, 2020.  
44 Peniel Ibe, “Trump’s Attacks on the Legal Immigration System Explained,” American Friends Service 
Committee, April 23, 2020, https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/trumps-attacks-legal-immigration-
system-explained. 
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United States has experienced an unprecedented surge of asylum-seekers and a huge backlog of 
immigration court cases, past deterrence-based policies and new exclusionary tactics have not 
achieved their goal of either lowering the amount of people seeking asylum or lightening the 
load of cases burdening the immigration courts.45  
Historically, deterrence-based immigration policies enacted since the mid-twentieth 
century have led to dangerous conditions for migrants attempting to reach the border and for 
undocumented immigrants in the United States. For example, President Bush passed the Secure 
Fence Act of 2006, which militarized the border and led to the construction of seven hundred 
miles of border wall. The intention of the wall was to create a physical barriers in places where 
the environment was not a natural barrier to entry. In theory, the Bush Administration intended 
for the wall to decrease the number of illegal entries into the U.S by both physically preventing 
entries and deterring migration to the U.S., but, in practice, the erection of the wall accomplished 
neither of those goals. In fact, it pushed migrants to attempt to cross the border at more remote 
and dangerous areas. Between 2006 to 2012, the death rate of migrants grew 212 percent, which 
closely matched the 218 percent growth of the border fence.46 Before the Bush administration 
passed the Secure Fence, a report from the Government Accountability Office in 2001 alerted 
him of the potential adverse effects. The report found that “migrants have always faced danger 
 
45 “Mapping Where Immigrants Reside While Waiting For Their Immigration Court Hearing,” Immigration Details 
(Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, March 24, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/600/. “Just 
under 100,000 cases were added to the Immigration Court's backlog since the beginning of FY 2020. A total of 
1,122,824 cases are now pending on the court's active docket as of the end of February 2020. This is up from 
542,411 cases when President Trump assumed office. When 320,173 inactive pending cases are included, the court's 
current backlog now tops 1.4 million cases.” 
46 David Bier, “Fences Made Crossings Deadlier—Asylum Made Them Much Less So,” Cato Institute (blog), 
January 24, 2019, https://www.cato.org/blog/fences-made-crossings-deadlier-asylum-made-them-much-less-so. 
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crossing the border and many died before INS began its strategy [from secure fence act, but] the 
strategy has resulted in an increase in deaths from exposure to either heat or cold.” 47 
Trump has taken these deterrence-based immigration practices one step further by 
implementing policies that deny asylum before asylum seekers even reach the U.S. border, or as 
I call them, exclusionary deterrence based policies.48 During the Summer of 2019, the Trump 
Administration implemented the Asylum Cooperation Agreements (ACAs), a exclusionary 
deterrence  based policy that specifically targeted Latin American migrants. ACAs or as non-
profits colloquially call them, “Unsafe Country Agreements,” are third-country agreements that 
allow the U.S. to return anyone seeking asylum in the U.S. who has passed through the Northern 
Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras) to one of those countries. 49 The agreements 
assume that Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras are stable enough and have adequate asylum 
protocols to accept, process and care for these refugees. However, to this day, U.S. receives a 
large portion of asylum seekers from the countries in the ACA agreements. In July 2019, 
detainees with citizenships from the Northern Triangle made up almost half the population in 
detention centers.50 The ACAs directly target Latin Americans and refugees traveling through 
Central America to reach the U.S. Moreover, the agreements also stipulate that migrants that do 
not seek asylum in one of the ACAs prior to seeking asylum in the U.S., legally cannot apply for 
asylum in the U.S. If they request, they can apply for a lesser form of protection that provides no 
means of permanent residence or citizenship.  
 
47 United States General Accounting Office, INS’ SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY Resource and Impact Issues 
Remain After Seven Years, 1-37, accessed April 1, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/231964.pdf. 
48 Anita Kumar, “After Delays, Trump on Track to Build More than 450 Miles of Border Wall,” POLITICO, 
February 14, 2020, sec. White House, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/14/trump-450-miles-border-wall-
115339. 
49 Immigration Justice Campaign. “The War on Asylum.” Webinar. March 31st, 2020. 
50 “Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detention,” Detention (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse), 
accessed May 3, 2020, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/detention/. According to the data from July 2019, 
the citizenship of detainees was 22% Hondurian, 15% El Salvadorian, and 10% Guatemalan.  
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Heart of the War: Migrant Protection Protocols 
Another exclusionary deterrence program that has most drastically changed the asylum 
system is Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) or otherwise known as “Remain in Mexico.”51 
MPP has upended the asylum system leaving migrants, advocates, and even DHS personnel 
struggling to navigate an unprecedented operation with little oversight and 
direction.52 Department of Homeland Security announced Remain in Mexico on January 24, 
2019. The program returns any migrant seeking asylum at the southwest border (except for 
unaccompanied minors and those in expedited removal proceedings released on bond or parole) 
to await their immigration court hearings in Mexico instead of in the U.S. Since its 
implementation, the United States has sent over 60,000 asylum seekers back to Mexico, and the 
number continues growing today.53 DHS describes MPP as a novel and safe improvement to the 
immigration system. However, the American Bar Association (ABA), the largest voluntary 
association of lawyers and legal professionals in the world, has expressed “deep concerns” that 
MPP “discriminates against Spanish-speaking asylum seekers and deprive[s] them of full and 
fair access to the American justice system.”54  
 
51 “A Timeline Of The Trump Administration's Efforts to End Asylum,” National Immigrant Justice Center, 
accessed April 1, 2020, https://www.immigrantjustice.org/issues/asylum-seekers-refugees. 
 
52 Immigration Justice Campaign. “The War on Asylum.” Webinar. March 31st, 2020. 
 
53 Immigration Justice Campaign Webinar with keynote speakers including Jocelyn Dyer: Counsel, Pro Bono 
Programs, Immigration Justice Campaign; Jennie Guilfoyle: Senior Training Attorney, Immigration Justice 
Campaign; Laura Peña: Pro Bono Counsel, ABA Commission on Immigration; and Jennie Kneedler: Staff Attorney, 
ABA Commission on Immigration 
54 SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY, FACILITATION, AND OPERATIONS COMMITTEE ON 
HOMELAND SECURITY UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  for the hearing on “Examining 
the Human Rights and Legal Implications of DHS’  ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy”. p1; “Migrant Protection 
Protocols,” Department of Homeland Security, January 24, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-
protection-protocols. The press release from DHS described MPP as a program that would “as a program that would 
“restore a safe and orderly immigration process, [and] decrease the number of those taking advantage of the 
immigration system…while ensuring that vulnerable populations receive the protections they need.” 
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There is a dangerous disparity between the way the Trump administration frames the 
successes and benefits of MPP and the reality of the program on the ground. The MPP press 
release describes the implementation of the Remain in Mexico program as a positive change that 
would lighten immigration court loads, prevent migrants awaiting their court hearing from 
“disappearing” in the United States, and decrease the amount of human smuggling and 
trafficking that occurs during the dangerous journey to the U.S., all while maintaining safety and 
due process for asylum seekers.55 According to a memo released by the secretary of DHS, 
Mexico must provide the following conditions for asylum seekers issued a notice to appear 
(NTA) and sent back to Mexico:56  
1. Authorization for the temporary entrance of foreign individuals  
2. “Equal treatment with no discrimination whatsoever and due respect to their human 
rights”  
3. The opportunity to apply for work permit and work 
4. Arrangements that ensure migrants are able to attend their court hearings  
Nearly a year since the launch of the program, the reality on the ground does not measure up to 
the benefits DHS has touted, nor has the United States or Mexico complied with their legal 
obligations to asylum seekers currently in the program. As of April 2020, the  
 
55 “Migrant Protection Protocols,” Department of Homeland Security, January 24, 2019, 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols. Note on migrants disappearing into the U.S.—
The claim that MPP would prevent migrants awaiting their asylum claim from disappearing in the United States 
before their hearing date is not a strong point/argument for the justification of MPP. The Trump administration 
already made it virtually impossible for asylum seekers, other than unaccompanied minors or vulnerable people such 
as pregnant women, to wait for their immigration hearing with family or acquaintance in the United States. Since 
2016, Immigration judges under the attorney general rarely issue parole, and if they do issue a bond for release the 
price is usually too high for an asylum seeker to pay. This was verified by interview 1 and 3 and personal experience 
in court proceeding with a Texas Judge. 
56 Kirsjen Nielsen M., “Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols,” Memorandum, 
January 25, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-
policy-guidance.pdf. 
 28 
San Diego, El Paso, Calexico, Laredo, Eagle Pass, and Brownsville port of entries and 
immigration courts put in place the Migrant Protection Protocols. The pictures in figure 1.6, 
courtesy of Katie Shepard, a member of the National Advocacy Counsel and American 
Immigration Council, demonstrate the “towns” that have sprouted up in Matamoros, Mexico, 
Brownsville’s counterpart.57  Immigration advocates have recounted the squalid conditions at the 
border tent towns where occupants lack basic human necessities like water, food, and proper 
shelter.58 Individuals living in these tent towns near ports of entry are regularly kidnapped, raped, 
and beaten by organized crime on the Mexican side of the border.59 Figure 1.7, a map released by 
the U.S. State Department’s travel advisory, shows that the U.S. qualifies one-third of the ports 
of entry with MPP in place as Level 4, “no travel zones.”60 The United States uses the Level 4 no 
travel zone classification for war stricken areas like Syria and Iraq. The State Department 
describes Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo in the Tamaulipas state as a place with “organized 
crime activity – including gun battles, murder, armed robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, forced 
disappearances, extortion, and sexual assault,” where  
“criminal groups target public and private passenger buses as well as 
private automobiles traveling through Tamaulipas, often taking passengers 
hostage and demanding ransom payments. Heavily armed members of 
criminal groups often patrol areas of the state in marked and unmarked 
vehicles and operate with impunity particularly along the border region 
from Reynosa northwest to Nuevo Laredo. In these areas, local law 
enforcement has limited capability to respond to crime incidents.” 61 
 
 
57 See Appendix A 
58 “Contrasting Experiences: MPP vs. Non-MPP Immigration Court Cases,” MPP (Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse, December 19, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/587/. 
59 “Contrasting Experiences: MPP vs. Non-MPP Immigration Court Cases.” 
60 See Appendix A 
61 U.S. Department of State, “Mexico Travel Advisory,” Mexico Travel Advisory, December 17, 2019, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html. 
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Validating the warnings issued by the U.S. State Department, speakers from the 
Immigration Justice Campaign webinar series recounted their experience at the border in 
November 2019:  
“I have been down to the border twice and talked to the asylum seekers 
themselves and they have indicated they are the victims of organized 
crimes and regularly get kidnapped by cartels in Mexico because they are 
so vulnerable in these areas...The last time I was there, it was 36 and 
raining and these people were trying to get their tents not to sink into the 
mud. There hundreds of children and infants living there.” 62 
 
In February 2020, nearly 2,500 migrants lived in a small tent town near Matamoros, 
Mexico, cooking on stoves made out of old washing machines, with little to no access to health 
care and or lawyers to help with their cases.63 According to TRAC, a nonpartisan, nonprofit data 
research center, MPP has contributed to longer wait times for first hearings. In December 2019, 
39 percent of immigrants in the MPP program were still waiting to have their Master Calendar 
Hearing compared to 36 percent of those who were allowed into the United States.64 Individuals in 
MPP also suffer from lack of income as they wait weeks to months for their hearings. Many times, 
individuals’ do not possess proper documentation after being returned to Mexico, rendering them legally 
unemployable. Consequently, their lack of documentation prevents them from improving their living 
standard at the border. Remain in Mexico puts individuals in a “Migrant Limbo.”65  
Another problem associated with MPP is the lack of transparency and clarity for asylum 
seekers. In an article published by the Atlantic in September, 2019, immigration writer, J. 
Weston Phippen described the experience of a Cuban migrant, Dana, in the MPP program. Like 
many other migrants who reached the U.S. border and were sent back to Mexico, Dana was left 
 
62 Immigration Justice Campaign Webinar. “War Against Asylum.”  
63 Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “‘He Turned Purple’: U.S. Overlooks Ill Asylum Seekers,” The New York Times, February 
22, 2020, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/22/us/politics/trump-asylum-remain-in-mexico.html. 
64 “Contrasting Experiences: MPP vs. Non-MPP Immigration Court Cases.” 
65 J. Weston Phippen, “Trapped in Juárez: Life in the Migrant Limbo,” The Atlantic, September 16, 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/09/us-mexico-mpp-ciudad-juarez/597796/. 
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confused. Having her Cuban paperwork, she luckily found a job waiting tables for $10 a 
day. When she received her notice to appear (NTA) after she first reached the port of entry, she 
did not understand she was placed in MPP. She believed that the date CBP told her to return to 
the port of entry would be the date she would be allowed into the United States, not her first 
hearing in front of an immigration judge. She did not fundamentally understand what it meant to 
be placed in MPP and how to navigate the asylum process she now found herself in. That is not 
uncommon.  
Using data published by TRAC, I found that 50 percent of all individuals placed in MPP 
were not present at their last hearing, automatically closing their case with an in absentia 
decision.66 That pales in comparison to the 89 percent of immigrants that ICE released into the 
United States who attended every court hearing. This discrepancy between the amount of 
migrants in MPP and those released in the U.S. who attend their hearings, relates to the fact that 
after migrants reach the port of entry and the Immigration Court issues them an NTA, 
Immigration Courts have no way to notify migrants in about any change in date, time, and 
location of their hearings. The information that does reach migrants in MPP often lacks thorough 
and clear information about how and where to cross the U.S. border to attend their hearing. 67 
Making the situation worse, over ninety-three percent of individuals sent back to Mexico 
never speak with a legal advisors or immigration attorney to assist them I navigating the asylum 
system.68 TRAC found that asylum seekers in the U.S. are seven times more likely to have an 
attorney than those placed in MPP. 69 Chances of being granted asylum with an attorney are low 
 
66 “Details on MPP (Remain in Mexico) Deportation Proceedings,” accessed February 26, 2020, 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/mpp/. 
67 Kanno-Youngs, “‘He Turned Purple.’” 
68 “Details on MPP (Remain in Mexico) Deportation Proceedings.” As of March 2020, 64,934 people have been 
placed in MPP and only 3,993 have been represented.  
69 “Contrasting Experiences: MPP vs. Non-MPP Immigration Court Cases.” 
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and almost abysmal without one.70 The reason many individuals in MPP lack representation is 
not because advocates do not want to help, but that legally they cannot practice in Mexico. 
Immigration attorneys today are presented with a difficult situation—desire to help but an 
inability to physically reach that population.71  
On top of the drastic change ushered by MPP, DHS opened two huge tent court facilities 
in Brownsville and Laredo to fast track MPP cases through the use of video teleconferencing. 
The tent courts function as virtual immigration court rooms for Remain in Mexico cases. During 
hearings, asylum seekers are held in tents at a port of entry while the judges, government 
attorneys and translators appear remotely via video teleconferencing in a traditional brick and 
mortar courtroom somewhere else. Because tent court facilities are on a port of entry, Customs 
and Border Patrol has full control of the facilities.72 If a migrant is a part of the seven percent 
with an attorney, MPP makes it difficult for the attorneys to actually have access to them because 
CBP and ICE have full jurisdiction over when attorneys can visit with their client.73 As a 
consequence, there is a total lack of legal orientation programs traditionally available to 
individuals entering the asylum process. Port courts have also been known to give out inaccurate 
or incomplete court documents that provide fake hearings and dates further confusing asylum 
seekers. 74 The largest issue with port courts, however, is the level of secrecy in which they 
operate. In December 2019, only one NGO had been allowed into the port court facility and that 
was before they were operating. Currently, DHS does not permit attorney observers into the 
facility, even though immigration hearings are public hearings.75  
 
70 “Contrasting Experiences: MPP vs. Non-MPP Immigration Court Cases.” 
71 Interviewee #1, interviewed by the author, Austin, Texas, February, 29, 2020.  
72 Immigration Justice Campaign. “The War on Asylum.” Webinar. March 31st, 2020. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Immigration Justice Campaign. “Latest Developments in the War on Asylum.” Webinar. March 31st, 2020.  
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Video Teleconferencing in Immigration Court Proceedings 
While DHS’ use of VTC for all MPP cases is alarming, the use of VTC in immigration 
court proceedings dates back almost 20 years to the Bush administration. In general, video 
teleconferencing began to appear in courts during the late 20th century for aspects of the criminal 
trial process such as arraignments, bail, sentencing and post-conviction hearings. An Illinois 
court was the first to conduct bail hearing over video in 1972.76 Florida courts followed suit to 
use videoconferencing for misdemeanors, and a Philadelphia court used video technology for 
preliminary arraignments.77 VTC eventually made its way into immigration court proceedings as 
a technological trial in Chicago, Illinois, with immigrants held at the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 
In 1996, Congress approved the use of using televideo technology in all immigration 
proceedings.  Between 1996 to 2007, the EOIR did not collect consistent data on which courts 
used VTC and in what capacity.78 It was not clear how quickly courts implemented VTC 
technology, what aspect of the immigration portion they used it for, and how successful its use 
was in hearings. However, after 2007, the EOIR made data about VTC including the 
adjudication medium public record. The data clearly shows a steady increase from 2007 to 
2012.79 
Since the tenure of former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the use of VTC in 
immigration hearings has skyrocketed. In a joint attempt by Department of Homeland Security 
and Executive Office of Immigration Review80 to lower the backlog of cases plaguing the 
immigration courts, they implemented the “Strategic Caseload Reduction Plan.” In the plan, 
 
76 Haas, “Videoconferencing in Immigration Proceedings.” 
77 Haas. 
78 Ingrid Eagly, “Remote Adjudication in Immigration,” Northwestern University Law Review 108, no. 4 (2015): 
933–1019. 
79 Eagly. 
80 a sub-committee of the DOJ whose role is to conduct removal proceedings in immigration courts 
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EOIR outlined five initiatives they indented on implementing and reaping the benefits of by 
2020. Initiatives included restricting Immigration Judges (IJ) ability to use administrative 
closure,81 case quotas for IJs,82 a reduction of continuances, a streamlined IJ hiring process and 
an increase in the use of VTC. The plan intended to “expand VTC’s adjudicatory capacity 
through the implementation of a pilot program of remote immigration adjudication centers. As of 
December 2019, a total of 15 judges sit in the adjudication centers located in Falls Church, 
Virginia, and Fort Worth, Texas. Since the initial implementation of VTC, the EOIR views VTC 
as a mechanism to “maximize EOIR’s current adjudicatory capacity, and thus help reduce the 
pending caseload by increasing productivity.” 
Methodology 
To analyze the impact of video teleconferencing on immigration court proceedings in 
2020, I aimed to replicate the qualitative research completed by Ingrid Eagly in 2015. To do so, I 
conducted interviews with immigration attorneys and other individuals such as law students who 
have represented asylum seekers. Through the interviews, I aimed to understand the lived 
experiences of attorneys, experts, and migrants in immigration court and their opinions on the 
use of VTC under President Trump’s administration. All participants were contacted through 
email or phone asking them to participate in a voluntary interview. After gaining verbal consent, 
all of the interviews were conducted via phone and followed a structured set of questions but 
depending on the interviewee’s experience and knowledge, I asked additional questions. 83 Each 
interview lasted no more than 40 minutes. To further understand the nuances of the U.S. 
 
81 Administrative closure was a common way for judges to manage their docket.  
82 The Plan called for caseload management benchmarks and goals. IJs had to complete 700 removal cases in 1 year 
or they risk losing their job. The National Association of Immigration Judges previously prohibited the use of 
quotas, but the DOJ and EOIR overruled them.  
83 View Appendix A.  
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immigration system, I worked as an intern for a non-profit that provided low-to-no-cost legal 
services to immigrant families in Texas. Through my internship, I observed an individual merits 
hearing conducted via VTC and visited the Hutto detention center located outside of Austin, 
Texas, several times. Although I have limited experience in immigration compared to other legal 
professionals, those few experiences helped me get hands on experience with the immigration in 
the United States and understand the gravity and importance of a well-functioning system. 
Limitations: Research in the midst of a Pandemic 
 My interviews for research came to a halt when the COVID-19 pandemic shut down non-
essential work, including universities and non-profits. Concerns that the coronavirus posed more 
of threat than initially thought increased during late February and early March, and within a two 
weeks, the University of Texas at Austin announced it was to be fully remote as did my 
internship for a non-profit that provided legal assistance to immigrants in Texas. Immigration 
Courts across the nation closed to the public and suspended and rescheduled all non-detained 
immigration cases all the way through May 15, 2020. During this time, detention centers and 
immigration courts still held detained hearings. The non-profit I worked for suspended in-person 
services in their entirety. During the pandemic, it was virtually impossible to enter detention 
centers because legal services and attorneys had to secure their own protective gear as ICE did 
not provide it to them. The non-profit I worked for found ways to work remotely with the 
detention center and continue legal services. Not all non-profits and advocacy groups, however, 
found ways to work with detention centers to continue providing their services. Different private 
companies contract detention centers and each have their own rules. The ability for the 
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continuance of legal serveries depends on the relationship between outside groups providing the 
services and the detention centers.84  
 Needless to say, conducting research during this unprecedented crisis presented many 
hurdles to overcome. However, the pandemic also provided a unique opportunity to probe the 
benefits of video teleconferencing. Without video teleconferencing capabilities in both 
immigration courts and detention centers, all asylum and relief claims would have completely 
halted leaving thousands more people in limbo. The next three sections analyze the past, present 
and future of the use of video teleconferencing in immigration hearings.  
 
Part II: The Impact of Video Teleconferencing in Immigration Court Proceedings 
Literature Review 
This section summarizes several ways in which scholars have approached looking into the effects 
of VTC on immigration court proceedings. The first portion of this section presents studies and 
researches the psychological effect of video-mediated communication. The second part focuses 
on summarizing the article, “Remote Adjudication,” by Ingrid Eagly, a Professor of Law at 
UCLA. In the article, Eagly uses court data to draw conclusions about the ways in which VTC 
effects the final outcomes of immigration proceedings. Through doing so, she makes data-based 
claims about the real impact of video teleconferencing, which she supports with qualitative 
evidence from her own experience as an immigration professor, interviews with immigration 
judges and other immigration experts, and personal experiences in immigration courts and 
detention centers around the nation. Eagly’s quantitative and qualitative findings will be used as 
reference to gauge the change in VTC use today in Part III.  
 
84 Immigration non-profit employee, telephone conversation, April 21, 2020.  
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 Although research of the use of video teleconferencing in immigration court proceedings 
is limited, existing studies have adopted two distinct methods of scholarship. One presents an 
argument rooted in communication and psychological studies. The other, which Eagly pioneered, 
uses comparative data from the outcomes of in-person asylum cases versus those conducted 
through VTC. Both methods present valuable insights that merit consideration.  
Communication and Psychology Research of Video-Mediated Communication 
 Videoconferencing changes the psychological effects of communication. In 2006, Aaron 
Haas, a judge at the 285th district court in San Antonio, published an article, “Videoconferencing 
in Immigration Proceedings,” in the University of New Hampshire Law Review, where he 
conducted a survey of research—old and new—pertaining to the psychology of communication 
inside and outside of the courtroom.85  
Outside the courtroom, Haas found that video-mediated communication caused a strong 
emotional disconnect between the actors involved. Invoking Marshall McLuhan, a Canadian 
philosopher who studied media, Haas explored the idea that “the medium is the message,” 
arguing that the means by which content is delivered often overshadows the meaning of the 
content itself.  He pointed to the 1960 presidential race between Richard Nixon and John F. 
Kennedy to substantiate his claim. During the campaign, radio listeners favored Nixon, while 
television viewers strongly preferred Kennedy. Scholars like James N. Drukman have argued 
that images shape opinions people form of others—in the case of the presidential debate, 
television images “affec[ed] the overall debate evaluations, prime[ed] people to rely more on 
personality perceptions in their evaluations, and enhance[ed] what people learn[ed].” 86 
 
85 Haas, “Videoconferencing in Immigration Proceedings.”,  
86 James N. Bruckman, “The Power of Televison Images: The First Kennedy-Nixon Debate,” The Journal of Politics 
65, no. 2 (2003): 559–71. 
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Considering today, the idea that the medium alters the reception of the message itself still 
remains true.  
President Trump is unique among presidents in the way he has used social media—and 
especially Twitter—to disseminate information and communicate with the American public. At 
the beginning of his presidency in 2016, he tweeted upwards of nine times per day.87  The New 
York Times called Twitter “a digital howitzer that [Trump] relished firing.”88 Many polls found 
that Republican net approval for Trump increased after tweeting racist remarks such as “go 
back” to representatives Ilhan Omar (D-MIN), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez 
(D-NY) and Ayanna Pressley (D-MA).89 However, since Trump has conducted daily press 
briefings at the White House to address the COVID-19 pandemic, his net approval fell 22 points 
since March 17, 2020.90  Similar to the Nixon-Kennedy first presidential debate, Trump’s 
approval dropped as he more appeared more frequently on television, thereby demonstrating the 
impact of the visual medium. I cannot claim with certainty that Trump’s approval rating would 
be higher if he used Twitter alone, but the precipitous decline in approval appears to correspond 
with his daily White House briefings. The economic downturn and general uneasiness for the 
United States during the pandemic has likely affected his approval ratings, as well.  
Haas also speaks to the importance that nonverbal communication (NVC) plays in the 
process of generating meaning through words.91 Albert Mehrabian, a psychologist at UCLA, 
 
87 Michael Shear et al., “How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in Over 11,000 Tweets - The New York Times,” 
November 2, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitter-presidency.html. 
88 Shear et al. 
89 Jessica Campisi, “Trump Sees Republican Support Rise after ‘go Back’ Tweets: Poll,” Text, TheHill, July 17, 
2019, https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/453441-trump-sees-support-from-republicans-rise-after-go-
back-tweets. 
90 Eli Yokley, “Net Approval of Trump’s Coronavirus Response Reaches New Low,” Morning Consult, April 27, 
2020, sec. Coronavirus, https://morningconsult.com/2020/04/27/trump-coronavirus-net-approval-new-low/. (Forty-
four percent of the U.S. population found the briefings infomrative, 54 percent found them frustrating, 47 percent 
found them counter-productive, and 29 percent found them presidential) 
91 Haas, “Videoconferencing in Immigration Proceedings.”, 69-70. 
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found that communication entails three elements—words, tone of voice and body. Those three 
elements are governed by the 7-38-55 percent rule, suggesting seven percent of communication 
is about the words, 38 percent of communication is based on tone of voice, and 55 percent is 
based on body language. Meaning in words only emerges where speech communication and 
gesture communication meet. The intersection where meaning is created was coined as the 
“growth point” (GP) by David McNeill, a Professor Linguistics at the University of Chicago. 92 
Elements that are essential to human communication, particularly eye contact, suffer as a 
consequence of video-mediated communication. According to an article published in Displays, 
an international journal covering research and development of display technology, eye contact 
during conversation directly impacts social constructs like trust.93 “Virtual eye-contact” is 
difficult to achieve in video-mediated communication because of logistical issues, such as the 
placement of the video camera with respect to the video screen. Subconsciously, the same level 
of trust built in face-to-face interactions does not occur over videoconferencing.94  
Haas also observes that people cognitively respond to images on a screen in much the 
same way as interactions in “real life.” For instance, watching someone eat a sandwich in real 
life would light up similar regions of the brain as watching someone eat a sandwich on a 
computer screen. Although that observation may appear to support the use of video 
teleconferencing, it actually presents larger issues. If an askew camera or monitor makes “eye-
contact” impossible, or if the video connection lags or delays responses, those actions could be 
interpreted as real actions and intentions by other participants on the call.  Although, those on the 
call consciously grasp they are communicating through video technology, subconsciously the 
 
92 Haas. 68.  
93 Leanne Bohannon et al., “Eye Contact and Video-Mediated Communication: A Review,” Displays 34, no. 2 
(April 2013). 
94 Bohannon et al. 
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brain does not differentiate in-person and video-mediated communication. Hass writes, “as video 
mediated communication distorts and diminishes [non-verbal] cues…the ability of the audience 
to distinguish between what they are seeing and real life will lead them to draw different and 
more negative conclusions about the individual than they would if [the individual] was actually 
present.” 95  Overall, video-mediated communication obscures important non-verbal cues that are 
central to the process of building trust while communicating. Video teleconferencing further 
diminishes the emotional connection between participants and is subject to the technical 
difficulties explained above.  
Empirical Findings of the Use of VTC in Immigration Court Proceedings 
 In 2015, Ingrid Eagly published an article in the Northwestern University Law Review 
that empirically analyzed millions of data points from the EOIR to compare the outcomes of 
immigration proceedings conducted via video teleconferencing versus in-person.96 Contrary to 
what many advocates and legal scholars believed, Eagly discovered that video adjudication did 
not have a direct impact on the final decision judges made with respect to the relief claim of the 
respondent; judges made their decision based on the facts presented to them. However, video 
teleconferencing immediately impacted whether or not a respondent filed an application for 
relief, as well as the respondent’s overall level of engagement with the adversarial processes 
involved with applying for asylum or other forms of immigration relief in the United States. In 
general, respondents processed through VTC disengaged with the processes outside of the 
courtroom that substantially affect the strength of their appeal. Eagly analyzed data by 
conducting observational studies of large data sets of information that were subject to the natural 
flows of immigration patterns and how accurately the data was recorded by the EOIR. Eagly then 
 
95 Haas, “Videoconferencing in Immigration Proceedings.” 67 
96 Eagly, “Remote Adjudication in Immigration.” 
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prepared the data by using only similar court cases and verified her findings by using three 
different statistical models of analysis. Her data uses points from FY 2011-2012 because prior to 
2007, the EOIR poorly recorded the use of VTC. As a result, Eagly analyzed the most recent and 
complete years of data available to her.97 
Beyond observing the disengagement of litigants, she found that ICE and EOIR used VTC 
almost solely for detainees and that the majority of cases that started via VTC ended with VTC. 
In 2012, detention centers and immigration courts unevenly distributed the use of video 
teleconferencing capabilities, making graphical location determinative as to whether or not VTC 
would be used. Of 60 immigration court jurisdictions in 2012, 84 percent of all televideo 
hearings were conducted in only 15 jurisdictions 98 ICE and the EOIR used VTC mainly for 
detained immigration hearings, and Eagly emphasized that “rather than a neutral adjudicate tool, 
televideo should be understood as an intentional design element of the rapid evolving detention-
to-deportation pipeline.”99 The increase in the use of VTC directly correlates with the increase in 
the practice of detaining immigrants during the Bush Administration in the post 9/11 
immigration era. By 2008, the proportion of detained immigrants reached an all-time high of 58 
percent. Once President Obama took office, the level of detention decreased to as low as 11 
percent. However, since Trump assumed office in January 2017, detention rates have surged as 
the administration has reinstated zero-tolerance policies that mandate detention over parole or 
bail.100  
 
97 Ingrid V. Eagly, “Remote Adjudication in Immigration,” Northwestern University Law Review 108, no. 4 (2015): 
960. 
98 Eagly. 956.  
99 Eagly. 956. 
100 “Where Are Immigrants with Immigration Court Cases Being Detained?,” Immigration Details (Transactional 
Records Access Clearinghouse, March 29, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/504/. 
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Eagly observed the majority of cases that began in one medium—in-person or through video 
teleconferencing—stayed in that medium for all hearings.101 Hybrid cases with both VTC and in-
person hearings were much rarer. They occurred under two scenarios: either VTC equipment was 
not available because of technical issues, courts transitioned their dockets to televideo, or a non-
detained person had their first Master Calendar Hearing in-person and were then detained and 
subject to a video teleconferenced individual merits hearings.102 
Eagly used three different types of analytical tools—a national sample, an active base city 
sample and finally a regression analysis of the active base city sample. The results of her analysis 
heavily rested upon the two-step nature of the asylum process: procedural outcomes and trial 
outcomes. Procedural outcomes include obtaining an attorney, applying for relief, and/or 
applying for voluntary departure trial; these outcomes occur occasionally before but more 
commonly after the Master Calendar Hearing. Trial outcomes include termination of the case, 
relief, or voluntary departure; these occur after the Individual Merits Hearing. 
For a national sample, Eagly considered 153,835 immigration cases across the U.S. during 
the fiscal year of 2011 and 2012 and removed any outlying cases. She discovered that detained 
VTC cases had less engagement with adversarial processes. Cases reviewed through VTC from 
the onset were less likely to obtain counsel, complete a form for relief, or request voluntary 
departure. She also found that immigration judges spent less time overall with VTC cases and 
completed such cases earlier than in-person cases by an average of 38 days.  VTC cases were 
much less likely to request continuances and move to an individual merits trial due to the 
absence of legal representation and failure to complete a full and correct relief application.  
 
101 Eagly, “Remote Adjudication in Immigration.” 955 
102 Ibid.  
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For active base cities, Eagly focused on a subset of cases that adjudicated at least 1,000 
televideo cases and 1,000 in-person video cases between the 2011 and 2012 span. This approach 
sought to avoid fluctuations in national data based on inconsistent VTC capabilities across states. 
Eagly observed once again that significantly fewer detainees that used VTC had legal counsel, 
applied for relief, and requested voluntary departure. However, after she looked at the 
respondents who sought relief (meaning they had successfully applied for relief in the United 
States) both in-person and VTC hearings had a 40 percent success rate. The outcome of the 
entire proceeding, from the EOIR issuing an NTA to the Master Calendar hearing, and if 
applicable, bond, parole, and individual merits hearing, a larger, statistically significant amount 
of VTC cases end in removal compared to in-person cases.  Yet, when only focusing on trial 
outcomes, which assumes the respondent filed an application for relief and saw a judge for an 
individual merits hearing, the communication medium of the hearing did not play a significant 
role on the final outcome of the case.  
The principal take away from those findings is that detainees seen through VTC are less 
likely to successfully navigate the immigration system due to their inability to engage directly 
with the legal system. However, if they managed to successfully apply for relief, the immigration 
judge generally makes a final decision on their case based on the legal fact presented to them 
without the interference of a typical hearing. Therefore, previous scholarship exploring  the 
impact of VTC (like Hass) did not fully grasp the impact that processing detainees through VTC 
could have on the procedural outcomes of cases. 
In fact, restricting access to the legal resources necessary to navigate the U.S. immigration 
system exposes much deeper, more structural inequities in our asylum system. The prevalence of 
video-mediated communication is but a symptom of this inequality, “a tool in the detention-to-
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deportation timeline.” Through the expansion of VTC, USCIS has foreclosed justice for asylum 
seekers, particularly detainees, barring access to individual merits hearings and other avenues for 
legal status in the United States. 103 
In part II, Eagly reflects on her own experiences in court rooms, detention centers and 
interviews with immigration experts. Through her interviews and personal experiences, she 
identified three main areas where VTC significantly impacted immigration hearings: respondent 
alienation, complications of litigation mechanics and disruption of working courtroom 
mechanics.  
When forced to rely on VTC, respondents expressed indignation. Most video rooms in 
detention centers are no more than a small room with a TV. Eagly said:  
“I had a similar reaction to the starkness of the video appearance rooms. 
Some of the hearing locations appeared to be broom closets equipped with 
a television and monitored by a guard sitting in the hallway. Others were 
larger utility-style conference rooms with gleaming concrete floors where 
respondents wearing prison-issued jumpsuits sat in rows of plastic lawn 
chairs—always in the presence of a guard rather than court staff. After 
their cases were called, the detainees were taken back to their cells in 
groups by a second guard.204 The entire experience was full of constant 
reminders that we were in a jail, rather than a courtroom.” 
 
Because of the discontent between respondents and the court, many immigrants do not 
understand the gravity of the situation or recognize the importance of the hearing in the same 
way if they were present in a courtroom. Eagly found that “respondents appearing in Master 
Calendar Hearing in the removal video room often appeared confused and unsure where to focus 
their eyes or direct their voices.”104 This recalls Haas’ observation that participants in video-
mediated conversations lost emotional connection and trust that would otherwise have been 
established vis-à-vis non-verbal communication.  
 
103 Eagly, “Remote Adjudication in Immigration.” 
104 Eagly. 990. 
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 Immigration hearings via video teleconferencing further complicated the mechanics of 
litigation. In-person detainees (very rarely) can file their application for relief and use the time 
with their attorney to complete any unfinished paperwork. However, with VTC, all parts of the 
application must be mailed to the courtroom in advance of the hearing. Detainees, especially pro 
se detainees, litigants without legal representation, cannot mount a strong case against their 
removal.  
Generally, remote adjudication complicates the lawyer-client relationship. Immigration 
attorneys may be less involved with cases because of the difficulty associated with speaking to 
their client. Additionally, during hearing, attorneys cannot hold confidential recess with their 
clients. With VTC, most attorneys conduct any interaction with their client over the screen in 
front of the judge and government attorney. For that reason, many immigration attorneys prefer 
to remain in the courtroom with the judge instead of the detention center with clients because 
they are, “less likely to alienate the judge and it allows the attorney to participate in off-the-
record discussions with the prosecutor and the judge.” 105  
Similarly, Eagly discovered that VTC interrupted the court room work group. Immigration 
court is an intimate space where the “players in immigration court know one another and work 
cooperatively and informally to determine the outcome of their cases.”106 The informal give-and-
take practices of the immigration court are central pieces to the outcome of many cases. Yet 
VTC removes the respondent almost completely from the specificities and nuances of the court 
room that can play crucial roles in determining the approval of relief. Eagly mentioned that: 
The reduction in interaction between the televised respondent and the other 
courtroom players was striking. At the formal courtroom end of the hearing, 
the detained appearing on the screen was only treated as a participant in the 
proceeding when directly asked question by the judge or by the counsel 
 
105 Eagly. 992. 
106 Eagly. 989 
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while testifying. At other times during the hearing, the court room players 
generally did not look at or engage with the video screen.107 
 
The respondent, arguably the most important person in the trial, is left on the outside of their 
own proceeding.  
Part III: Qualitative Research 
The following section revisits Eagly’s findings from her research in 2015 to evaluate how 
the Trump Administration uses VTC and how VTC’s impact has changed over the eight-year 
period between 2012 and 2020. Unlike Eagly, I was not able to use large datasets made 
available through being a TRAC fellow. However I recreated her qualitative research to the best 
of my ability. The following section will refer to my experience as an undergraduate student 
working at a non-profit that provides legal services to immigrants and detainees in the Texas 
area, visits to the John T. Hutto detention center, observations at an immigration court 
proceeding and interviews with immigration attorneys and University of Texas Law students. To 
make my findings easy to understand and directly comparable to Eagly’s conclusions, I will be 
answering the following questions: 
1. Does the EOIR reserve the use of VTC for detained cases? 
2. How do Immigration attorneys judge the level of alienation felt by respondents 
because of the use of VTC?  
3. What litigation mechanics complications does VTC Cause? 
4. How does VTC disrupt the courtroom working group? 
VTC Use for Detainees 
Does the EOIR still reserve the use of VTC for detained cases? 
 
107 Eagly. 992 
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In her studies, Eagly observed that immigration courts used VTC mainly for detainees 
with the intention of faster detention center processing. In 2020, that still proves true and 
immigration courts still predominately use VTC for detained proceedings. In the first quarter of 
the 2020 fiscal year (October 2019-December 2019), three-fourths of detained Master Calendar 
hearings which reached a decision forty-four percent of credible fear hearings that reached 
decisions were completed through VTC.108 In general, in the first quarter of 2020, considering 
only final Immigration Court hearings, 17 percent of hearings were held by VTC.109 
The use of VTC in detention centers across the United State is also still skewed. Eighty-
four out of 185 detention facilities currently have VTC capabilities.110 Even within the select 
group of detention centers that use video teleconferencing, certain detention centers use their 
VTC technology more than others. For example, the Houston Service Processing Center 
completed close to all of its 818 hearings during the first quarter of 2020 via VTC. 111 Other 
locations, however, like the Atlanta Detention Center, only completed 13 out of 243 proceedings 
through video. All courts have different technical capabilities with respect to video 
teleconferencing and today, several detention centers even have immigration courts within them.  
As shown in figure 3.1, during the first quarter of the 2020 fiscal year, Texas held the most final 
hearings through a video medium.112 But the figure is slightly misleading because of the large 
amount of migrants who cross the border and are tried in Texas compared to other states. To take 
the relative flow of immigrants into different states into consideration, Figure 3.2 graphs the 
percentage of final hearings completed with video teleconferencing and to ensure that states with 
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a small number of total final hearings did not skew the data, the figure below only considered 
states that completed over a total of 1,000 final immigration hearing during the allotted time.113  
The graph shows that courts in New Mexico, Virginia, Texas and Illinois are most likely to use 
video teleconferencing. TRAC did not have data available about the number of detainees from 
the first  quarter of the fiscal year of 2020, but they did have data available about the amount of 
detainees per state, county, and detention center for individual months in 2019. From April till 
July (the last set of available data), Texas unequivocally and consistently had the largest number 
of detainees, followed by Louisiana, then Arizona and California. Figure 3.3 shows the number 
of detainees per state from July 2019.114 Looking at the data presented by both figure 3.2 and 
figure 3.3, there is not a strong correlation between the number of detainees and the level of VTC 
used.115 New Mexico had only 549 detainees total in the month of July 2019, but immigration 
judges used VTC for over 50% of detainees’ final hearings between October 2019 and December 
2019.116 This suggests that the use of VTC heavily relies upon the abilities of the detention center 
and immigration court, as well as the number of detainees at any given period. Detainees in New 
Mexico are significantly more likely than detainees in Arizona, for example, to face VTC in their 
hearings, ultimately impacting their chance of a successful asylum claim. 
 Upon examination of data from detention centers and their use of VTC from the first 
quarter of the fiscal year of 2020, the majority of cases for MPP “port courts” were recorded as 
in-person hearings. Of the three MPP courts currently open and operating at the South West 
Border of Texas—El Paso port of entry, Brownsville Gateway International Bridge, and the 
Laredo port of entry—the government reported that close to 90 percent of final hearings were 
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held in person. The stats are similar for MPP courts in Calexico and San Ysidro, California and 
the El Paso Border Patrol Station in New Mexico.117  This data is misleading, however, because 
port courts built for the purpose of adjudicating MPP cases rely almost entirely on VTC. Data 
from TRAC suggests otherwise. The discrepancy between the data and reality suggests that DHS 
and EOIR are misclassifying MPP hearings as in-person hearings rather than video 
teleconferenced hearings. This lack of transparency supports the notion that the Trump 
Administration has been operating the MPP courts with impunity.  
 
Respondent Alienation 
How do Immigration attorneys judge the level of alienation felt by respondents because of the 
use of VTC? 
My interviews and research suggest that respondent alienation due to VTC is a growing 
problem, especially for those placed in MPP.  The conditions of video rooms in detention centers 
that detainees must use for their hearings are similar to this in Eagly’s study. A law student at the 
University of Texas who has participated in VTC immigration proceedings described the VTC 
rooms in the John T. Hutto detention in the following terms:  
“So small and there's not enough room on the video screen for there to be 
more than two people in the shot. There are no windows. Many of the clients 
I have had described it like a closet. And for people who are victims of 
trauma or torture, it's [common] for it to be similar to the space where they 
were tortured.118 
 
117 “Contrasting Experiences: MPP vs. Non-MPP Immigration Court Cases.” Percentage of In-person final hearings 
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118 Interviewee #3, interviewed by the author, Austin, Texas, February, 29, 2020.  
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Isolation from the court room and placement in a small isolated “closet” make the proceedings 
seem less “real” even though the fate of the respondent’s future rests upon the decision made by 
the judge.119  
 Video teleconferenced hearings also contribute to a lack of understanding by the 
respondent. When courts use VTC and the respondent does not speak English proficiently, the 
court provides an interpreter. However, the court has a limited number of in-person interpreters 
that speak foreign languages other than Spanish, especially indigenous languages of Mexico and 
Guatemala. The judge usually relies on a telephone interpreter in lieu of a real person. In such 
cases, not only is the respondent obligated to communicate with an immigration judge through a 
video medium, but they must also parse out the nuances of the proceedings through a distant 
interpreter via court room phone.120  As a consequence, “there's a huge disconnect and nobody 
knows what their rights are.”121 Due to communication difficulties, judges often cut respondents 
off mid-sentence or ask them to clarify what they mean. During an immigration court proceeding 
I observed with a Texas Immigration judge, a notoriously stern judge, asked the respondent to 
clarify their statement’s eleven different times. Both the judge and the respondent visibly became 
frustrated with one another.122   
Complication of Litigation Mechanics 
What litigation mechanics complications does VTC cause? 
Since 2012, there have been no substantive improvements to the quality of VTC 
proceedings. Proceedings held via video teleconferencing are still unable to make efficient use of 
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paperwork or courtroom strategies like in-person hearings. Detained respondents still must send 
their completed relief applications and burden of proof via fax or standard mail in advance of their 
scheduled hearing. If the respondent fails to do so, the judge will likely reset the hearing, 
prolonging immigration limbo for detainees. Attorneys still voice frustrations with the 
inefficiencies of immigration court cases as they applies to hearings held through VTC.  
Beyond contributing to respondent alienation, MPP has worsened litigation mechanics. A 
Texas attorney expressed his dissatisfaction with MPP and VTC being used in conjunction with 
one another. He disclosed that 
“The other problem [with VTC] is that logistically, filing documents when 
you can’t be in front of a judge is really annoying. Normally you can just 
hand the judge documents, including the respondent’s burden of proof, 
which is used to prove the respondent has a credible fear of being harmed 
based on one of the protected grounds. But to do that, they have to 
produce evidence in support of their claim, and if they can’t, their claim 
will be denied. But, how do you produce those documents, especially if 
you are in Mexico. I mean, do you do international mailing? You could do 
that, but it is expensive. At VTC you most commonly hand your 
documents to a guard and the guard has to fax it. Some of these documents 
in support of an asylum claim are close to 100 pages…Faxing 100 pages 
takes time, it is impractical, and some judges will reset the hearing 
because they don’t want to wait they have a busy and full docket…On top 
of that, in all proceedings you are expected to give a copy to opposing 
counsel. So, then the court has to make copies of what you’ve faxed over. 
123 
 
Respondents in VTC proceedings still struggle with an ability to directly access judges. not 
Many essential aspects of immigration proceedings, like submitting applications and documents, 
are stuck in an analog past, even though DHS and the EOIR tout the technological advancements 
of VTC. Problems with litigation mechanics demonstrate how the government wants to increase 
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the number of immigration proceedings held through video, but without attending to any of its 
drawbacks.   
Courtroom Workgroup 
Is the courtroom working group still disrupted because of VTC? 
 Video teleconferencing continues to disrupt the dynamics of courtroom working groups 
in much the same way as 2012. Attorneys are still unable to communicate confidentially with 
their clients. Respondents are still excluded from off the record conversations. And respondents 
are still ignored by court room players like the judge and trial attorney. MPP has only 
exacerbated this isolation.  
 For immigrants with legal representation, courts have prevented attorneys from 
communicating with their clients privately during video teleconferenced trials. When I observed 
an individual merits hearing conducted through video, the immigration attorney sat at a steel 
rectangular table. The government attorney sat at the opposite side of the room and the 
respondent was displayed on a TV on a side wall. I could only see the respondent’s face and 
shoulders because of camera angle. The respondent consistently made eye contact to the upper 
left corner of the screen. The attorney I shadowed explained to me that the judge, who had two 
computer screens before him, had the respondent displayed on just one. Throughout the entire 
trial, even during five minute breaks when the judge left the court room, the attorney did not 
exchange any pleasantries with the respondent, give any advice, or clarify any confusions the 
during the proceedings because the government attorney remained in the room at all times. 
Communication independent of the TA and general court room audience, like myself, was 
virtually impossible.  
 52 
 The video medium also excluded the respondent from off the record conversations and 
interactions that commonplace in any courtroom. I had not observed an immigration court 
proceeding before and I was shocked by how little the judge, government attorney, and 
immigration attorney acknowledged the respondent. After the case was concluded and the judge 
left the courtroom to consider the evidence of the case, the immigration attorney and government 
attorney struck up a casual conversation while the respondent awaited the approval or denial of 
their asylum claim. I found the stark contrast between the gravity of the moment on one hand and 
the casual, easy-going conversation on the other perplexing.  
Although I did not experience any technical difficulties in the individual merits hearing I 
observed, technical issues caused by VTC disrupt many hearings. One attorney related  the 
complications that occurred in the courtroom during a VTC trial with her client.  
“I had one client where we had many many technical issues making it 
extremely difficult to argue her case. Luckily, she won, but during the trial 
she was crying and you could only see her forehead. On top of that, the 
entire call was fuzzy. Overall, we won, so that was a good experience, but 
[VTC] definitely detracted from the story my client was telling…Judges 
also get frustrated while working with clients over VTC because they cannot 
communicate efficiently and truly hear the story of the litigant. That 
negatively effects the client. Having a frustrated judge looking over your 
case is not what you want.”124  
 
Even when video teleconferencing works well, like in the case that I observed, empathizing with 
a story and communicating effectively remain difficult. When technical difficulties plague a 
video mediated hearing, judges become frustrated and respondents comprehend less of the 
proceeding. Like the case presented above, video teleconferenced hearings do not always 
inevitably end in removal, but they do not make the process any easier or more efficient for any 
of the parties involved.  
 
124 Interviewee #4, interviewed by the author, Austin, Texas, February, 29, 2020.  
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 Generally, I found that many of the issues raised by Eagly in 2015 about the 
consequences of video teleconferencing still apply today.  
Part IV: Suggestions on How to Use VTC 
 
This section presents ways to mitigate the negative effects of video teleconferencing in the 
courtroom.  
1. Ensure the reliability and uniformity of all video teleconferencing technology used 
across the nation. 
Technological issues should not impact respondents’ understanding of their legal rights 
and the steps necessary for them to apply for relief. To prevent unnecessary impediments during 
court proceedings, DHS and the EOIR must regularly conduct maintenance on video 
teleconferencing equipment in immigration courts, detention centers and Migration Protection 
Protocol court tents on the border. If the technology is out of date or presenting issues, the court 
should be obligated to temporarily halt video conferences with that equipment until it’s replaced. 
This is especially true for tent courts.  
2. Provide a confidential way for attorneys and respondents to communicate during 
hearings. 
Respondents and their attorneys cannot communicate with one another during individual 
merits hearings conducted with video teleconferencing. The government should create a separate 
phone line for respondents and attorneys to communicate and further provide private rooms both 
in the detention center and immigration court for them to speak. Although this would not be 
equivalent to communication that occurs between an attorney and a client in person, it would at 
least provide a secure and confidential means for communication during the proceeding.  
3. Create a more efficient way to send in additional documents for hearings/reduce the 
amount of paperwork and bureaucracy involved in applying for relief. 
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There is a large discrepancy between the ease in which respondents via in-person and 
VTC hearings can turn in necessary paperwork to the courtroom. Respondents in VTC hearings 
should be given an alternative means outside of mailing and faxing documents to the court. 
Alternative ways include making a larger portion of relief applications available online, however 
this would entail detention centers to undergo a large infrastructure change. They would then be 
obligated to provide a significant amount of internet and computer access to detainees to be able 
to complete their applications. A more realistic alternative is that the EOIR could create an 
online website for detainees to upload all of their documents beforehand. Before the trial begins, 
both the judge and government attorney will have a printed copy of the application, which the 
respondent would have uploaded several hours to minutes before the case. If there are any last-
minute changes or additional signatures necessary, the respondent can fax over the necessary one 
or two pages opposed to hundreds of pages at the start of the trial.  
4. Reserve the use of VTC for trial hearings.  
Video teleconferencing does not increase the likelihood of an immigration judge denying 
relief. However, VTC does impact procedural outcomes that precede individual merits hearings. 
If a respondent does not understand their rights, the way in which they must present their case, 
how to fill out an application for relief and how to find counsel, they will likely not have a strong 
case for their relief claim. Although it may seem counterintuitive, if DHS and the EOIR insist on 
using VTC, they should use it solely for individual merits hearings and ensure that asylum 
seekers understand their legal rights and how to navigate the immigration system. At the end of 
the day, the judge determines the final outcome of the trial based on the facts presented before 
him. If the respondent, especially pro se respondents, do not mount a sufficient and complete 
case, they will be removed.  
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Part V: Conclusion 
 The notion that America is both a nation of law and a nation of immigrants belies 
historical and contemporary immigration policy. Probing this disjuncture further can help us see 
the ebb and flow of restrictive and open immigration and asylum policy.  
In exploring Trump’s assault on asylum, we can identify how small policy and procedural 
changes can drastically transform (or undermine) the legal system. Since 2016, the Trump 
administration has uprooted asylum, particularly through the Migrant Protection Protocols, 
putting thousands of migrants lives at risk. Video teleconferencing may appear to play an 
insignificant role in immigration proceedings at large, but it is just one weapon in Trump’s 
crusade against legal immigration.  
Before immigration courts recorded and released data on VTC use, scholars argued 
against video teleconferencing by citing research on the psychology of communication. Scholars 
like Aaron Haas made strong points about the inability to build trust between respondent and 
judge because of the video mediated communication. Years later, Eagly discovered that the 
correlation between depressed rates of relief in detained cases conducted via video 
teleconferencing was a consequence of litigants’ disengagement with the legal process. 
Respondent alienation, complication of litigation mechanics, and disruption of the courtroom 
working groups adversely impacted VTC hearings in 2012 and, as I found eight years later, in 
2020. The Migrant Protection Protocols only exacerbated these problems.  
The government intended for VTC to improve immigration courts efficiency. Instead, 
VTC became a tool of the detention-to-deportation pipeline during the Bush and Obama 
administration and is now an accomplice to human rights violations committed by the Trump 
administration’s war on asylum. Before the use of VTC increases, the government must seriously 
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Figure 1.1 Example of the 
Immigration Quotas based on National 
Origin from the 1924 Immigration Act 
Figure 1.2: Political cartoon from 
1921 depicting the large amount of 
Europeans attempting to immigrate 
to the United States and Uncle Sam 
only letting the 3% allowed by the 
quota.  
Figure 1.3: Bar Graph of 100 years of 





























Figure 1.4: Removals and Returns of Unlawful Immigrants and 
Numbers of Guest Worker Vistas between 1942-2011 provided by the 
Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and 
Naturalization Services. 




Figure 1.6: Pictures of tent towns 
on the border of Brownsville and 
Matamoros 
Figure 1.7: U.S. State Department Travel Advisory 






































































States with Immigration Courts 
Figure 3.1: Total amount of Final hearings through VTC versus the state 
they are held in. Orange bars are states on the southwest border of the United 
States 



































































Figure 3.2: Percentage of immigration hearings conducted using 
VTC versus the state. Orange bars are states on the southwest border 
of the United States 
 
Figure 3.3: The amount of detainees 
held in detention centers in the four most 
highly populated states (Texas, 
Louisiana, Arizona, California) and 
states with the highest percentage of 
VTC final hearings from first Q1 of FY 







Skype at the Border: A Qualitative Exploration of Video Teleconferencing Use in Immigration 
Removal Proceedings in the Trump Era 
 
(Participants will be instructed not to discuss immigration status of individuals or families) 
 
1. What is your experience in the immigration field? 
 
2. How has the implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols impacted immigration practices 
at large in the United States?  
 
3. Has it (MPP) impacted your work specifically, if so, how? 
 
4. Have you witnessed or experienced immigration court proceedings via video teleconferencing?  
a. If yes, describe the experience:  
i. Were you in the court room with the Judge or involved/watching in another 
capacity?  
ii. Was it (video teleconferencing) used in a master calendar hearing or an 
individual merits hearing or other? 
iii. How was the connection/quality of the call? 
iv. if interpretation was needed, was it provided and effective?  
v. Is there a difference in the way litigants approach the courtroom via video 
teleconferencing opposed to an in-person hearing? 
 
5. In your opinion, how does video teleconferencing affect overall immigration court proceedings?  
  
6. Is video teleconferencing being used in conjunction with the Migration Protection Protocols to 
conduct court hearings at the border of Mexico and the United States?  
 
a. If yes, describe the experience: 
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